Sewage as a Possible Transmission Vehicle During a Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak in a Densely Populated Community: Guangzhou, China, April 2020.

BACKGROUND: Sewage transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has never been demonstrated. During a COVID-19 outbreak in Guangzhou, China in April 2020, we investigated the mode of transmission. METHODS: We collected clinical and environmental samples from quarantined residents and their environment for RT-PCR testing and genome sequencing. A case was a resident with a positive RT-PCR test regardless of symptoms. We conducted a retrospective cohort study of all residents of cases' buildings to identify risk factors. RESULTS: We found 8 cases (onset: 5-21 April). During incubation period, cases 1 and 2 frequented market T where a COVID-19 outbreak was ongoing; cases 3-8 never visited market T, lived in separate buildings and never interacted with cases 1 and 2. Working as a janitor or wastepicker (RR = 13; 95% CIexact, 2.3-180), not changing to clean shoes (RR = 7.4; 95% CIexact, 1.8-34) and handling dirty shoes by hand (RR = 6.3; 95% CIexact, 1.4-30) after returning home were significant risk factors. RT-PCR detected SARS-CoV-2 in 19% of 63 samples from sewage puddles or pipes, and 24% of 50 environmental samples from cases' apartments. Viruses from the squat toilet and shoe-bottom dirt inside the apartment of cases 1 and 2 were homologous with those from cases 3-8 and the sewage. Sewage from the apartment of cases 1 and 2 leaked out of a cracked pipe onto streets. Rainfall after the onset of cases 1 and 2 flooded the streets. CONCLUSIONS: SARS-CoV-2 might spread by sewage, highlighting the importance of sewage management during outbreaks.

Investigation of a Cluster of Severe Respiratory Disease Referred from Uganda to Kenya, February 2017.

On February 22, 2017, Hospital X-Kampala and US CDC-Kenya reported to the Uganda Ministry of Health a respiratory illness in a 46-year-old expatriate of Company A. The patient, Mr. A, was evacuated from Uganda to Kenya and died. He had recently been exposed to dromedary camels (MERS-CoV) and wild birds with influenza A (H5N6). We investigated the cause of illness, transmission, and recommended control. We defined a suspected case of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) as acute onset of fever (≥38°C) with sore throat or cough and at least one of the following: headache, lethargy, or difficulty in breathing. In addition, we looked at cases with onset between February 1 and March 31 in a person with a history of contact with Mr. A, his family, or other Company A employees. A confirmed case was defined as a suspected case with laboratory confirmation of the same pathogen detected in Mr. A. Influenza-like illness was defined as onset of fever (≥38°C) and cough or sore throat in a Uganda contact, and as fever (≥38°C) and cough lasting less than 10 days in a Kenya contact. We collected Mr. A's exposure and clinical history, searched for cases, and traced contacts. Specimens from the index case were tested for complete blood count, liver function tests, plasma chemistry, Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and MERS-CoV. Robust field epidemiology, laboratory capacity, and cross-border communication enabled investigation.